试题详情

　　There have been differences among most presidents’ advisers ever since. Thomas Jefferson was accused of relying on an “invisible, inscrutable” group of associates that engaged In backstairs influence. 　　Franklin Roosevelt managed to be a pretty good resident, though even his idolatrous supporters concede that he took his advice from inside and outside the White House and even took a mischievous delight in playing one staff or cabinet member against another. 　　Ike followed the military staff system. He did not spend hours listening to the disputes of his principal aides, but gave Sherman Adams and later General Bedell Smith authority and responsibility for settling differences. When his chief of staff could not settle differences, he insisted on a one-page memorandum defining the problem, no matter how complicated, and then made his decision. 　　Harry Truman did not believe in the single chief of staff. He had six principal advisers with whom he met every morning. At the end of the day, he would have a little bourbon and branch-water with one of them in the Oval Office, then would take a bundle of papers upstairs, put on his green eyeshade and read reports until late in the night. 　　John F. Kennedy followed much the same system with his brother Robert, Larry O’Brlen, Kenny O’Donnell and Ted Sorensen at his side, though their assignments were not limited as rigidly as those of the Truman advisers. Lyndon Johnson did not invite criticism or differences which his staff or cabinet, but bullied his advisers into compliance, which helps explain his troubles in Vietnam. 　　Richard Nixon ran his staff by stealth. He did his homework and mastered the details of policy, but he delegated vast powers to Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman in an atmosphere of Byzantine secrecy and intrigue. 　　Jimmy Carter had his troubles between his White House staff and his cabinet, particularly over the conduct of foreign policy. But his White House staff was drawn from a group of Georgia friends who got along with one another comparatively well. He met with the principal members every morning, held a foreign policy meeting often for hours every Friday morning, invited, and listened to disputes, sometimes over the most intricate details of policy. 　　Mr. Reagan’s way is a reflection of his character and his personality. He is more interested in, presenting policy than forming it. He does not have a controlling chief of staff; he does not limit his principal advisers to a special field of concentration like Mr. Truman, but lets the Big Four—Mr. Baker, Mr. Clark, Michael Deaver and Edwin Meese play the field and run across one another; he does not dominate or intimidate his staff, like Mr. Johnson; and he does not read and work like Mr. Carter.